Difference between revisions of "STIR/SHAKEN"
m |
|||
| Line 2: | Line 2: | ||
STIR/SHAKEN acronyms for Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) and Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information Using toKENs (SHAKEN). | STIR/SHAKEN acronyms for Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) and Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information Using toKENs (SHAKEN). | ||
| + | |||
| + | STIR/SHAKEN framework is only operational on IP networks | ||
STIR/SHAKEN is a carrier-based Caller ID authentication standard that helps verify that a call is in fact from the number displayed on the Caller ID and not spoofed. | STIR/SHAKEN is a carrier-based Caller ID authentication standard that helps verify that a call is in fact from the number displayed on the Caller ID and not spoofed. | ||
| Line 20: | Line 22: | ||
* Traceback capability | * Traceback capability | ||
* Robocall/Spoofing Violation reporting and data sharing | * Robocall/Spoofing Violation reporting and data sharing | ||
| + | |||
| + | The FCC requires that all voice service providers certify in the Robocall Mitigation Database that they have fully implemented STIR/SHAKEN or have instituted a robocall mitigation program to ensure that they are not originating illegal robocalls. To further protect consumers, gateway providers – those serving as the entry point for foreign calls into the United States – must both implement STIR/SHAKEN and institute a robocall mitigation program. All providers are required to submit to this public database the contact information for the personnel at their company responsible for robocall-mitigation related issues. And those providers certifying to their implementation of a robocall mitigation program are required to include descriptions of the reasonable steps they are taking to avoid originating illegal robocall traffic. | ||
| + | |||
| + | For Non-IP networks: providers using older forms of network technology are required to either upgrade their networks to IP or actively work to develop a caller ID authentication solution that is operational on non-IP networks. | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Category:Telephone]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Telephone Technology]] | ||
| + | [[Category:VoIP]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Law]] | ||
Revision as of 08:12, 20 January 2024
Also known as Verified Caller ID.
STIR/SHAKEN acronyms for Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) and Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information Using toKENs (SHAKEN).
STIR/SHAKEN framework is only operational on IP networks
STIR/SHAKEN is a carrier-based Caller ID authentication standard that helps verify that a call is in fact from the number displayed on the Caller ID and not spoofed.
FCC Mandate: FCC rules require most providers to implement and use STIR/SHAKEN in the Internet Protocol (IP) portions of their networks. This is part of the TRACED Act.
This relates to the FCC TRACED Act. TRACED also being an acronym, Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence.
TRACED Act Caller ID Authentication Tools
- Implementation of STIR/SHAKEN
- Assessing Barriers to Implementing STIR/SHAKEN
- Number Resources - both toll free and non-toll free numbering resources
- Consumer Call Blocking
- Unauthenticated Number Protection
- Reassigned Number Database Report
- Report to Congress on the One-Ring proceeding
- Hospital Robocall Protection Group (HRPG)
- Traceback capability
- Robocall/Spoofing Violation reporting and data sharing
The FCC requires that all voice service providers certify in the Robocall Mitigation Database that they have fully implemented STIR/SHAKEN or have instituted a robocall mitigation program to ensure that they are not originating illegal robocalls. To further protect consumers, gateway providers – those serving as the entry point for foreign calls into the United States – must both implement STIR/SHAKEN and institute a robocall mitigation program. All providers are required to submit to this public database the contact information for the personnel at their company responsible for robocall-mitigation related issues. And those providers certifying to their implementation of a robocall mitigation program are required to include descriptions of the reasonable steps they are taking to avoid originating illegal robocall traffic.
For Non-IP networks: providers using older forms of network technology are required to either upgrade their networks to IP or actively work to develop a caller ID authentication solution that is operational on non-IP networks.
