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* postfix - The mail transfer agent (MTA), the boss.* postfix - The mail transfer agent (MTA).* saslauthd (SASL) - This is what authenticates you when you try to send an email. Rather than managing a relay list, SASL requires authentication before permitting the sending of email.* [[saslauthd]] (SASL) - This is what authenticates you when you try to send an email. Rather than managing a relay list, SASL requires authentication before permitting the sending of email.The offending attacker connects to dovecot and issues several attempts to send messages as a number of different users. Dovecot only logs the initial connection, that process ID is tagged along with the IP address of the attacker. Then PAM gets the requests for all of the different login names being thrown at it. PAM has to work with SASL to check if the logins are valid. Each time a process ID is generated that tags both PAM and SASL with the same ID, however, the IP address is not captured here. It is not PAM's job to communicate with the system to capture IP addressing, as this would create unnecessary overhead for PAM and negatively impact an otherwise quick process. The problem is, other than a relative timestamp, the PID, or tagged id to the log entry only match the PAM to SASL communication, and cannot be matched up against Dovecot. This is fine for a small mail server with few users. However, when other user authentication requests are coming though on the same timestamp, it can be difficult to match up the log entries generated by pam in the messages and secure log against the offending postfix log entry in maillog, the only place the actual attacker IP address can be gleaned.[[Postfix mailer and Dovecot]] handles email accepting and delivery for messages to local users and from local users to remote destinations. The attacker connects to dovecot and issues several attempts to send messages as a number of different users. The attacker doesn't know actual system usernames, so the attacker uses a dictionary list of common names and hopes to try name after name until there's a match. Dovecot only logs the initial connection, that process ID is tagged along with the IP address of the attacker; that is logged in log/'''maillog''' . PAM then gets the requests for all of the different login names being thrown at it. PAM has to work with SASL to check if the login names are valid. Each time a process ID is generated that tags both PAM and SASL with the same ID. Log entries are generated in two places, log/'''messages''' and log/'''secure''' . The problem with the entries in the '''messages''' and '''secure''' log is that no IP address is captured. It is not PAM's job to communicate with the system to capture IP addressing, as this would create excess overhead for PAM. Matching these entries with the '''maillog''' is difficult. Other than a relative timestamp, the PID, or tagged id to the log entry only match the PAM to SASL communication, and cannot be matched up against Dovecot. This is fine for a small mail server with few users. However, when other user authentication requests are coming though on the same timestamp, it can be difficult to match up the log entries generated by pam in the '''messages''' and '''secure''' log against the offending postfix log entry in '''maillog''', the only place the actual attacker IP address can be gleaned. What can happen is there are so many saslauthd processes open that legitimate users are unable to login and authenticate. In data center (A) a mail server was so overloaded with saslauthd processes, the system admin couldn't even connect directly to the system to perform an emergency shutdown of dovecot. == prevention options == === Block SMTP Authentication Attacks With Fail2Ban === {{:Block SMTP Authentication Attacks With Fail2Ban}} == monitoring == It is a fact that today most mail servers are frequently scanned for username and password combinations. These dictionary attacks against mail servers seems to be all the rage since about 2010, hitting an all time high in 2014. Most attacks from from the APNIC IP blocks, however, compromised systems in your own area might be under the control of someone doing system scanning on your machine. Blindly blocking foreign subnets isn't enough. Closely monitoring the log file: tail -f /var/log/secureprovides a very clear view of the user and pass being tried. Several combinations are attempted per connection. For each one line of failed authentication in the maillog there may be a dozen or more lines of user/pass combinations being tried visible in the secure log. The number depends on your dovecot configuration limits. It is interesting to see the "common" usernames being attempted. The attacker is typically running a script that automates the attack. Sometimes an improperly configured script being ran by the attacking script-kiddie will hammer dovecot with a username like 'null' repeatably for hours. The entertainment value in that is that it is a waste of the attackers time. The sad part is that it is also a waste of your system and network resources. Once you have fail2ban properly configured, you can monitor it with a high debug level to see how well it is performing. A debug level of "4" is the most verbose. Use this for a short duration while you are working out the glitches and fine tuning. A debug level of "2" or "1" is appropriate for continued use. tail -f /var/log/fail2ban-test.logAlthough you can configure fail2ban to add log entries to the syslog, it is recommended you have it log to its own file while debugging. With a debug level of 4 a lot of entries are added to the log. Plus it is easier to monitor fail2ban when it has a dedicated log file. Once you have it running smoothly you may opt to configure it to log to the syslog, or continue to log to a unique file. This setting is in the fail2ban.local configuration file. logtarget = /var/log/fail2ban-test.log When you see iptables rules being added by fail2ban, they will be in chains labeled "fail2ban-postfix" (depending on your own customized configuration). Here is an example of an attacker being blocked by an iptables rule generated by fail2ban: iptables -I fail2ban-postfix 1 -s 105.237.97.175 -j DROP If your system has very few static iptables rules, then you can view what is going on with a simple iptables -LHowever, for systems with 1000s of iptables rules, it is more useful to list only those created by fail2ban iptables -L fail2ban-postfixNow we see all firewall rules generated by fail2ban for postfix. Lastly, a most useful feature of fail2ban is the ability to send you reports by email. You can configure fail2ban to send you email notifications when it bans a host. By default fail2ban is configured not to send any mails. You will have to make modifications to enable it. Edit jail.local to set up email notifications. Email notification is sent as an "action" and in the case of notifications for these smpt auth attacks, is under the label [sasl-iptables] Using action.d/mail.conf to email you a notification on common activities such as: fail2ban service start, banning and unbanning an address. vi ./fail2ban/jail.localFind the line in the enabled action. An action can have multiple lines. Add a line under action = mail[name=postfix-sasl, dest=yourmailbox, sender=fail2ban@localhost, sendername="Fail2Ban SASL"]In this example, actions adding iptables rules for smtp attack will result in an email sent to yourmailbox. key words: saslauthd pam_unix smtp auth authentication failure